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Abstract
Machine learning for malware classification shows encour-
aging results, but real deployments suffer from performance
degradation as malware authors adapt their techniques to
evade detection. This evolution of malware results in a phe-
nomenon, known as concept drift, as new examples become
less and less like the original training examples. One promis-
ing method to cope with concept drift is classification with
rejection in which examples that are likely to be misclassified
are instead quarantined until they can be expertly analyzed.
We revisit TRANSCEND, a recently proposed framework
for performing rejection based on conformal prediction theory.
In particular, we provide a formal treatment of TRANSCEND,
enabling us to refine conformal evaluation theory—its under-
lying statistical engine—and gain a better understanding of
the theoretical reasons for its effectiveness. In the process, we
develop two additional conformal evaluators that match or
surpass the performance of the original while significantly de-
creasing the computational overhead. We evaluate our exten-
sion on a large dataset that removes sources of experimental
bias present in the original evaluation.
Finally, to aid practitioners, we determine the optimal oper-
ational settings for a TRANSCEND deployment and show how
it can be applied to many popular learning algorithms.
These insights support both old and new empirical findings,
making TRANSCEND a sound and practical solution, while
shedding light on how rejection strategies may be further
applied to the related problem of evasive adversarial inputs.
1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) algorithms have displayed superhu-
man performance across a wide range of classification tasks
such as computer vision [17] and natural language process-
ing [13]. However, a great deal of this success is conditional
on one central assumption: that the training and testing data
are drawn identically and independently from the same under-
lying distribution (i.i.d.) [8].
In a security setting this assumption often does not hold. In
particular, malware classifiers are deployed in dynamic, hos-
tile environments where new paradigms of malware evolve
in order to chase profits, new variants arise as novel vulner-
abilities and exploits are discovered, and adversaries switch
behavior suddenly and dramatically when faced with updated
defenses. This causes the incoming test distribution to di-
verge from the original training distribution, a phenomenon
known as concept drift [20]. As time goes by, the performance
of the classifier begins to decay as the number of incorrect
predictions made by the model increases.
There appear to be two broad approaches to tackling con-
cept drift: the first is to design systems which are intrinsi-
cally more resilient to drift by developing more robust feature
spaces. For example, it has recently been suggested that neu-
ral networks may be more resilient to concept drift as the
latent feature space better generalizes to new variants [27].
However, designing robust feature spaces is an open research
question and it is not clear if there even exists such a malware
representation for which concept drift will unlikely occur.
A second solution is to adapt to the drift, for example by
updating the model using incremental retraining or online
learning [21, 38]. However, in order to be effective, decisions
about when and how to take action on aging classifiers must
be taken quickly and decisively. To do so, accurate detection
and quantification of drift is vital.
This problem is precisely the focus of TRANSCEND [15],
a statistical framework that builds on conformal predic-
tion theory [35] to detect aging malware detectors during
deployment—before their accuracy deteriorates to unaccept-
able levels. TRANSCEND proposes a conformal evaluator that
utilizes the notion of non-conformity to identify and reject
new examples that differ from the training distribution and
are likely to be misclassified; the corresponding apps can then
be quarantined for further analysis and labelling. While effec-
tive, the original proposal suffers from experimental bias, is
extremely resource intensive and thus impractical, fails to pro-
vide guidance on how to integrate it into a detection pipeline
and, perhaps more importantly, lacks a theoretical analysis
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that shed light on the reasons of its effectiveness.
In this paper we revisit conformal evaluator and TRAN-
SCEND [15] to clarify its internal workings rooted in a sound
theory and determine effective operational settings. We addi-
tionally propose a novel extension that matches or surpasses
the performance of the original while significantly decreasing
the computational overhead.
In summary, this work makes the following contributions:
• Formal Treatment. We investigate the theory underpin-
ning the motivation and intuition of conformal evaluation
to explain its effectiveness and support the empirical eval-
uations presented in both this work and the original (§3).
Building on this insight, we formalize TRANSCEND’s
calibration procedure as an optimization problem (§4).
• Novel Conformal Evaluators. We develop two
novel conformal evaluators: inductive conformal eval-
uator (ICE) (§5.2) and cross-conformal evaluator
(CCE) (§5.3), both of which are firmly grounded in con-
formal prediction theory and able to effectively identify
and reject drifting examples while being significantly
less computationally demanding than the original pro-
posal. We evaluate our proposals with a dataset span-
ning 5 years (2014–2018) containing ~10% malware
that eliminates sources of bias present in the original
proposal (§6).
• Operational Guidance. We compare different opera-
tional settings of TRANSCEND including the effects of
including algorithm confidence (§6.3) and of different
search strategies (§5.4) during thresholding. To aid prac-
titioners in adopting TRANSCEND as a rejection frame-
work, we include a discussion of how to integrate TRAN-
SCEND into a typical security detection pipeline (§7).
To enable researchers and practitioners to make better use
of classification with rejection strategies, we publicly release
our implementation of TRANSCEND, along with our improve-
ments and the data used for our empirical evaluations (§9).
2 Background
We focus on classification for security tasks (§2.1) which are
affected by concept drift (§2.2). In particular, we are interested
in improving the state-of-the-art approaches for classification
with rejection (§2.3).
2.1 Machine Learning and Security Detection
Machine learning is a set of statistical methods for automating
data analysis and enabling systems to perform tasks on the
data without being explicitly programmed for them. In the
malware domain, typical tasks include binary classification
(detecting malicious examples [4, 38]) and multiclass clas-
sification (predicting the family of an example [12, 32, 33])
but can also extend to more complex tasks such as predicting
the number of AV engines that would detect an example [16],
inferring Android malware app permissions based on their
icons [37], or generating functional Windows malware using
reinforcement learning [3].
In this paper we focus on classification tasks where a classi-
fier g aims to learn a function mapping X →Y , where X ⊆Rn
is a feature space containing vectors that describe interesting
properties of the applications and Y is a label space contain-
ing malware family names in the multiclass classification task
and 0 or 1 in the detection task denoting benign or malicious
applications, respectively.
2.2 Concept Drift
One of the greatest challenges facing machine learning-based
malware classifiers is the presence of dataset shift [1, 15, 19]
as the distribution of malware at test time begins to diverge
from the training distribution. This violates one of the core
assumptions of most classification algorithms: that the train-
ing and test time are identically and independently drawn
from the same joint distribution (i.i.d.). As this assumption
weakens over time, the classifier’s predictions become less
and less reliable and the performance degrades.
Dataset shift can be broadly categorised into three types of
shift [20]. Covariate shift refers to a change in the distribution
of P(x ∈ X ), when the frequency of certain features rises or
falls (e.g., variations in API call frequencies over time). Prior
probability shift or label shift is a change in the distribution
of P(y ∈ Y ), when the base rate of a particular class is altered
(e.g., an increase in malware prevalence over time). Concept
drift is a change in the distribution P(y ∈ Y |x ∈ X ). This
often occurs when the definition of the ground truth changes,
for example, if a new family of malware arises which, given
the feature space representation X , is indistinguishable from
benign applications. Due to the model’s limited knowledge,
the model start misclassifying examples from the new family,
even if no covariate or prior probability shift is occurring. In
practice, when dataset shift occurs it can be extremely difficult
to determine how much error should be attributed to each type
of shift. Given this, it is common in the security community
to collectively refer to all types of shift as concept drift, a
custom that we continue in this work.
The impetus for concept drift in malware classification is
the adversarial nature of the task. The authors of malware
are driven by the profit motive to try and evade detection or
classification by app store owners, antivirus companies, and
other security agents. This incentivizes them to innovate: to
obfuscate features of their malware, develop new methods
for exploitation and persistence, and explore new avenues of
profiteering and abuse. This causes the definition of malware
to evolve over time, sometimes in sudden and unexpected
2
DR
AF
T
(a) Nearest centroid (b) Polynomial SVM (c) RBF SVM (d) 3-NN
(e) Random forest (f) QDA (g) MLP sigmoid (h) MLP with SVM RBF
Figure 1: Possible NCMs for different classification algorithms: nearest centroid, support-vector machines (SVMs), nearest neighbors (NN), random forest,
quadratic discriminant analysis (QDA), and multilayer perceptrons (MLPs). The solid line delineates the decision boundary between classes  and # while the
dotted lines show SVM margins. The shaded region captures points which are more nonconform (i.e., ‘less similar’) than the new testing point, shown by the
asterisk, with respect to class  . As NCMs, (a) uses the distance from the class centroid; (b) and (c) use the negated absolute distance from the hyperplane;
(d) uses the proportion of nearest neighbors belonging to class #; (e) uses the proportion of decision trees that predict #; (f) uses the negated probability of
belonging to class  ; (g) uses the negated probability output by the final sigmoid activation layer; (h) uses the outputs of the final hidden layer to train an SVM
with RBF kernel and uses the negated absolute probabilities output by that SVM—note that the decision boundary still depends on the MLP output alone.
ways.
2.3 Rejection
There are multiple avenues to dealing with concept drift. The
most effective solution would be to design a feature space
X such that it is entirely robust to concept drift, essentially
distilling all possible malware behaviour down to a ‘Platonic
ideal’ [28] that captures maliciousness no matter what form it
takes. However, given the diversity of malware it is extremely
difficult to design such a feature space. Additionally, some
behaviour is only considered malicious due to it’s context,
for example, requesting access to device contacts might be
considered suspicious for a torch app but not for a social
messaging app.
An alternative is to identify, track, and mitigate the drift as
it occurs. One promising approach to do this is classification
with rejection [5], in which low confidence predictions, caused
by drifting examples, are rejected. Drifting apps can then
be quarantined and dealt with separately, either warranting
manual inspection or remediation through other means.
TRANSCEND [15] is a state-of-the-art framework for per-
forming classification with rejection in security tasks. It uses
a conformal evaluator to generate a quality measure to assess
whether a new test example is drifting with respect to the train-
ing data. If the prediction of an underlying classifier appears
to be affected by the drift, the prediction is rejected. The orig-
inal proposal presented two case studies: Android malware
detection—a binary classification task, and Windows malware
family classification—a multiclass classification task. The ex-
periments showed that the framework is consistently able to
identify drifting examples, providing a significant improve-
ment over thresholding on the classifiers’ output probabilities.
However, the computational complexity of the framework
limited its use in real-world deployments.
3 Conformal Evaluator
The statistical engine that drives TRANSCEND’s rejection
mechanism is the conformal evaluator, a tool for measuring
the quality of predictions output by an underlying classifier.
Conformal evaluator design is grounded in the theory of con-
formal prediction, a method for providing predictions that
are correct with some guaranteed confidence. In this section
we revisit the relationship between the two to provide some
insights and intuition into why conformal evaluation is a good
fit for the classification with rejection setting.
3.1 Conformal Evaluation vs. Conformal Pre-
diction
Here we give an overview of conformal prediction and how it
motivates the use of conformal evaluation; for a more formal
treatment we refer to Vovk et al. [35]. Conformal prediction
allows for predictions to be made with precise levels of con-
fidence by using past experience to account for uncertainty.
Given a classifier g, a new example z = (x,y), and a signif-
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1 - max(p  , p ) 1 - p {   }0 10.68 0.92{   ,   }Ø
Figure 2: The nested confidence intervals at which labels  and # are present in the output label set for a testing example with per-class p-values p = 0.32
and p# = 0.08. The shaded areas outline how credibility and confidence relate to the intersection of prediction regions for which the label set contains a single
element. The relatively high probability of the empty set containing the correct label (i.e., low credibility) indicates that one of conformal prediction’s assumptions
may have been violated. In conformal evaluation, this is used as a signal that the new example is likely to be out-of-distribution and is indicative of concept drift.
icance level ε, a conformal predictor produces a prediction
region: a set of labels in the label space Y that is guaranteed
to contain the correct label y with probability no more than
1−ε. To calculate this label set, the conformal predictor relies
on a nonconformity measure (NCM) derived from g and uses
it to generate scores representing how dissimilar each exam-
ple is from previous examples of each class. To quantify this
relative dissimilarity, p-values are calculated by comparing
the nonconformity scores (§3.2) between examples. As well
as these p-values, two important metrics are derived from the
prediction region, confidence and credibility (§3.3), which can
be used to judge the effectiveness of the conformal prediction
framework. An important assumption in conformal prediction
is that the sequence of new test examples is exchangeable,
a generalization of the i.i.d. property (where all examples
are independent and drawn from the same underlying joint
probability distribution). This assumption enable conformal
predictors to make strong guarantees on the correctness of
each prediction.
Rather than making predictions, conformal evaluators [15]
borrow the same statistical tools (i.e., nonconformity mea-
sures and p-values) but use them to instead evaluate the qual-
ity of the prediction made by the underlying classifier g. By
detecting instances which appear to violate the exchangeabil-
ity assumption they can, with high confidence, reject new
drifting examples which would otherwise be at risk of being
misclassified.
3.2 Nonconformity Measures and P-values
In order to reject a new example that cannot be reliably clas-
sified, conformal evaluators rely on a notion of nonconfor-
mity to quantify how dissimilar the new example is to a
history of past examples. In general, a nonconformity mea-
sure (NCM) [29] is a real-valued function that outputs a score
describing how different an example z is from a bag of previ-
ous examples B = Hz1,z2, ...,znI:
αz = A(B,z). (1)
The greater the value of αz, the less z has in common with
the elements of the bag B. Typically an NCM will be formed
of two components: a metric d(z,z′) to measure the distance
between two points, and a point predictor zˆ(B) to represent
B:
A(B,z) := d(zˆ(B),z). (2)
As an illustration of this concept, Figure 1a shows an NCM
for a nearest centroid classifier in which the Euclidean dis-
tance is used for d(z,z′), and the nearest class centroid is used
for zˆ(B).
For a new example z∗, the conformal evaluator must decide
whether or not to approve the null hypothesis asserting that z∗
does not belong in the prediction region formed by elements
of B. To perform such a hypothesis test, p-values are calcu-
lated using the NCM values for each point. First the noncon-
formity score of z∗ must be computed (Equation 3) along with
nonconformity scores of current elements in B (Equation 4),
then the the p-value pz∗ for z∗ is given as the proportion
of points with greater or equal nonconformity scores (Equa-
tion 5):
αz∗ = A(B,z∗) (3)
S = HA(B\ HzI,z) : z ∈ BI (4)
pz∗ =
|α ∈ S : α>= αz∗ |
|S| (5)
In the classification context, TRANSCEND can calculate
p-values in a label conditional manner, such that B contains
only previous examples of class yˆ ∈ Y where yˆ = g(z∗) is
the predicted class of the new example. If pz∗ falls below a
given significance level the null hypothesis is disproved and
yˆ is accepted as a valid prediction.TRANSCEND computes
per-class thresholds to use as significance levels (§4).
As p-values are calculated by considering nonconformity
scores relative to one another, NCMs can be transformed
monotonically without any impact on the resulting p-values
at all. Thus, when designing an NCM in the form given by
Equation 2, the distance metric d(z,z′) is of significantly less
importance than the point predictor zˆ(B). It’s important to
note that conformal evaluator algorithms are agnostic to the
underlying NCM chosen, but the quality of the NCM—and
particularly of zˆ(B), can have a large effect on the ability
of conformal evaluators to discriminate between valid and
invalid predictions [29].
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An alpha assessment [15] can be used to empirically evalu-
ate how appropriate an NCM is for a given dataset. An alpha
assessment plots the distribution of p-values for each class, fur-
ther split into whether the prediction was correct or incorrect.
As incorrect predictions should be rejected by TRANSCEND,
they are expected to fall below the threshold, while correct
predictions are expected to fall above the threshold and be
marked as valid. By analyzing how well-separated correct and
incorrect predictions are, it is possible to estimate how viable
finding a threshold will be. Poorly separated distributions of
correct and incorrect p-values indicate an inappropriate NCM.
An example of an alpha assessment on a toy dataset is shown
in Figure 3d.
Figure 1 illustrates a range of possible nonconformity mea-
sures for different algorithms on a toy binary classification
task with existing class examples  /# and new testing ex-
ample B. The solid line delineates the decision boundary
between the two classes, the dotted lines show SVM margins
where relevant, and the blue shaded region captures points
that are more nonconform (i.e., less similar) than B with re-
spect to class  . Note from the figure that the shape of the
nonconformal region need not reflect the shape of the regions
for the predicted classes (e.g., Figure 1a) and that there may
be multiple viable NCMs for the same underlying algorithm
(e.g., Figures 1g and 1h).
3.3 Credibility and Confidence
Recall that conformal prediction produces a prediction region
given a significance level ε. The possible prediction regions
are nested such that the higher the confidence level, the more
labels will be present. As a trivial example, a prediction re-
gion containing all possible labels may be produced for a
significance level of ε= 0 (maximum confidence) as it will
contain the true label y with certainty. At the other extreme,
an empty set can be produced at a significance level of ε= 1
(minimum confidence), as this is an impossible result under
the closed-world assumption of conformal prediction.
Of particular interest is the prediction region containing a
single element which lies between these extremes. Related to
this prediction region, a conformal predictor also outputs two
metrics: confidence and credibility.
Confidence is the greatest 1− ε for which the prediction
region contains a single label which can be calculated as the
complement to 1 of the second highest computed p-value.
Confidence quantifies the likelihood that the new element
belongs to the predicted class.
Credibility is the greatest ε for which the prediction region
is empty and corresponds to the largest computed p-value.
Conformal predictors can be forced to output single predic-
tions (rather than a label set induced by ε), in which case they
will output the class with the highest credibility. Credibility
quantifies how relevant the training set is to the prediction.
A low credibility indicates that conformal prediction might
not be a suitable framework to use with the given data. This
is because a low credibility means that the probability of the
correct label being in the empty set is relatively high, which
is an impossible result under the closed-world assumption of
conformal prediction.
In conformal evaluation, this probability is directly inter-
preted as the probability that the i.i.d. assumption has been
violated. Thus, a low credibility means that there is a high
probability that the corresponding example is drifting with
respect to the previous history of training examples. Such
an example is at risk of being misclassified due to limited
knowledge of the classifier.
It should be noted that formally, conformal evaluation de-
fines credibility and confidence slightly differently. In confor-
mal evaluation, the credibility is the p-value corresponding to
the predicted class and the confidence is the complement to 1
of the maximum p-value excluding the p-value correspond-
ing to the predicted class (i.e., the credibility p-value). This
subtle difference is important to clarify the operational con-
text of a conformal evaluator: whereas conformal predictors
output the final classification decision, conformal evaluators
output a statistical measure separate to the decision of the
underlying classifier (hence the nomenclature: one predicts
and the other evaluates). In practice, given reasonable NCMs,
these definitions of credibility and confidence can be treated
as equivalent.
3.4 Transductive Conformal Evaluator (TCE)
In assessing the quality of a prediction for a new test point,
there is still the question of which previously encountered
points the new point should be compared to—that is, which
elements are included in the bag B of Equation 3, and how.
Typically, new test points are compared against a set of cali-
bration points. In practice, there are a number of possibilities
for deciding on this calibration set, each with their own ad-
vantages and disadvantages.
In Jordaney et al. [15], conformal evaluation was realized
using a Transductive Conformal Evaluator (TCE). With a
TCE, every training point is also used as a calibration point.
To generate the p-value of a calibration point, it’s first re-
moved from the set of training points and the underlying
classifier trained on the remaining points. Given the newly
trained classifier, a predicted label is generated for the cal-
ibration point. Finally, using a given NCM, its p-value is
computed with respect to the points whose ground truth label
matches its predicted label. This procedure is repeated for
every training point. Following this, TRANSCEND’s thresh-
olding mechanism operates on the calculated p-values to de-
termine per-class rejection thresholds (§4). At test time, the
underlying classifier is retrained on the entire training set, and,
similarly to the calibration points, the p-values are computed
with respect to the p-values of the calibration sets.
Algorithm 1 describes the calibration and testing process
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(d) Alpha assessment
Figure 3: Thresholding procedure applied to a linear SVM with approximate-TCE (3 folds). Four points highlighted with dotted outlines are left out as calibration
in each fold, with the decision boundary obtained with the remaining points as training. P-values, shown above or below each calibration point, are calculated
using the negated absolute distance from the decision boundary as an NCM. The shaded regions capture points which are more nonconform with respect to the
predicted class (blue for class  and red for class #). The alpha assessment (d) shows the distribution of p-values and per-class thresholds derived from Q1 of
the correctly classified points (see §5.4 for a discussion of more complex search strategies for finding thresholds).
using TCEs in a general form that also applies to our novel
approximate variant (see §5.1)
4 The Transcend Framework
TRANSCEND is a framework that builds on the similarity
scores generated by a conformal evaluator and uses them to
derive thresholds with which to accept or reject new testing
examples. Broadly, TRANSCEND consists of two phases: cali-
bration and testing.
4.1 Calibration Phase
The first phase of TRANSCEND is the calibration procedure
which searches for a set of per-class credibility thresholds
T = {τy ∈ [0,1] : y∈ Y } which aim to separate drifting from
non-drifting points. Low credibility represents a violation
of conformal prediction’s exchangeability assumption and
these points are likely to be misclassified by the underlying
classifier which similarly assumes that the i.i.d. property holds.
Note that thresholds can be found with different optimization
criteria and it is also possible to threshold on a combination
of credibility and confidence, which we explore in §6.3.
Calibration aims to answer the question: “how low a cred-
ibility is too low?”, by analyzing the p-value distribution
of points in a representative, preferably stationary, environ-
ment such as the training set. Exactly which points from the
training set are selected as calibration points depends on the
underlying conformal evaluator, and this comes with various
trade-offs (see §5). Typically, each calibration point (or par-
tition of the calibration set) is held out and the underlying
classifier trained on the remaining points. Then a class is pre-
dicted for the calibration point(s) and a p-value calculated for
the point with respect to that predicted class. This process
is repeated until all calibration points are assigned a corre-
sponding p-value. Using the ground truth, these p-values can
be divided into correct and incorrect predictions. Finally, T
can be chosen to effectively separate the correct and incor-
rect predictions, either using manual methods (e.g., picking
a quartile visually using an alpha assessment) or automated
search strategies (e.g., grid search).
Figure 3 shows an example of the TRANSCEND threshold-
ing procedure on a toy dataset of 12 points belonging to two
classes:  and #. A linear SVM is paired with a TCE (§3.4)
to generate NCMs and p-values for the binary classification
with rejection task. The decision boundary is depicted as a
solid line and margins are drawn through support vectors with
dotted lines. Due to the use of approximate TCE, the dataset is
partitioned into folds, where each fold leaves out four points
for calibration and trains on the remainder. The three folds
are depicted in Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c. Calibration points are
shown with dotted outlines and are faded for class  .
In each fold, a p-value is calculated for each calibration
point as the proportion of other objects that are at least as
dissimilar to the predicted class as the calibration point it-
self. In the linear SVM setting shown, less similar objects
are those closest to the decision boundary (i.e., those with a
higher NCM) residing in the shaded area between the decision
boundary the parallel line intersecting the point (blue for class and red for class #). The calculated p-values are shown
aligned above or below each calibration point.
To evaluate how appropriate an NCM is for a given model,
the p-values can be analyzed with an alpha assessment. Here
the distribution of p-values for each class are divided into
groups depending on whether the calibration point was cor-
rectly or incorrectly predicted as that class. Given that there
may not enough incorrectly classified examples to perform
the assessment with, it is standard to perform an alpha as-
sessment in a non-label-conditional manner, using p-values
computed with respect to all classes, not just each point’s
predicted class. The greater the margin separating the dis-
tributions of correct and incorrect p-values, the better suited
an NCM is for a model. The alpha assessment in Figure 3d
shows the distribution of p-values for correct and incorrectly
predicted calibration points for classes  and #. Note that
given the size of the toy dataset, the assessment is computed
in a label-conditional manner, considering only the predicted
classes during the calibration. A threshold is chosen for each
6
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(c) Comparison to threshold
Figure 4: Test-time procedure applied to a linear SVM and calibrated TRANSCEND with distances from hyperplane and corresponding noncomformity scores
shown in (a). In (b) a new test point is classified as class #. The p-value is calculated as the proportion of points belonging to # with equal or greater
nonconformity scores (captured by the shaded region) than the new point. In (c), the new point is compared against the threshold for class # as derived during
the calibration phase (Figure 3). As the p-value of the new point is greater than the threshold for the predicted class, the prediction is accepted.
class, in Figure 3d this is simply set at Q1 of the p-values
for correctly classified points (more insight into threshold
search strategies can be found in §5.4). Test points generating
p-values that fall below this threshold will be rejected.
4.2 Test Phase
At test time, there are |Y |+ 1 classification options. When
a new testing object z∗ arrives, its p-value pyˆz∗ is calculated
with respect to the predicted class yˆ (label conditional). If
pyˆz∗ < τyˆ, the threshold for the predicted class, then the null
hypothesis—that z∗ is drifting relative to the training data and
does not belong to yˆ—is approved and the prediction rejected.
If pyˆz∗ ≥ τyˆ, the predicted is accepted and the object classified
as yˆ.
Figure 4 follows on from the calibration example above.
Figure 4a illustrates the NCM being used: the negated abso-
lute distance from the hyperplane. In Figure 4b, a new test
example B appears and is classified as class #. The p-value
p#B = 0.714 is calculated as the proportion of points belong-
ing to # with equal or greater nonconformity scores than B.
Finally, Figure 4c shows p#B compared against the threshold
τ# and, as p#B ≥ τ#, the prediction is accepted.
4.3 Rejection Cost
What exactly happens to rejected points depends on the rest
of the detection pipeline. In a simple setting, rejected points
may be manually inspected and labelled by specialists. Alter-
natively, they may continue downstream to further automated
analyses or to other machine learning algorithms such as un-
supervised systems.
In all cases there will be some cost associated with reject-
ing classifier decisions. As a result, when choosing rejection
thresholds, it’s vital to keep this cost in mind and weight it
against the potential performance gains. The TESSERACT
framework [27] defines three important metrics to use when
tuning or evaluating a system for mitigating time decay.
Performance ensures that robustness against concept drift
is measured appropriately depending on the goals of the prac-
titioner (e.g., high F1 score or high TPR at an acceptable FPR
threshold).
Quarantine cost is a measure of the cost incurred by re-
jecting points. This cost is important for putting the perfor-
mance of kept elements into perspective and there will often
be a trade-off between rejecting a large amount of points and
higher performance on kept points.
Labelling cost is a measure of the manual effort needed to
find ground truth labels for new points. While this is more
pertinent to retraining strategies, it’s heavily related to the
overhead associated with rejection as many rejected points
may need to be manually labelled. As an example, Miller
et al. [19] estimated that an average company would be able
to manually inspect and label 80 samples per day. It would not
be feasible for such a company to deploy rejection thresholds
that reject a greater amount.
4.4 Formalizing the Threshold Search
In order to ensure quality thresholds are found, TRANSCEND’s
calibration procedure can be modeled as an optimization prob-
lem in which the aim is to maximize a given performance
metric (e.g., F1, Precision, or Recall of kept elements). Usually
this maximization is subject to some acceptable performance
in another metric. For example, it is trivial to attain high F1
performance in kept elements by accepting only a few highest
quality predictions. However, this will involve rejecting un-
acceptably high number of objects, which incurs some kind
of associated cost (quarantine, manual inspection, relabelling,
etc).
Formally, given n calibration points, we can represent this
as:
argmax
T
F (Y,Yˆ ,P;T )
subject to G(Y,Yˆ ,P;T )≥ C ,
(6)
where Y and Yˆ are n-dimensional vectors of ground truth
and predicted labels respectively, P is a |Y |×n-dimensional
matrix of calibration p-values and T = {τy ∈ [0,1] | y ∈ Y }
is the set of thresholds. The objective function F maps these
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inputs to the metric of interest in R, for example F1 of kept el-
ements, while G maps to the metric to be constrained, such as
the number of per-class rejected elements. C is the threshold
value that bounds the constraint function. In §5 we propose
an implementation that uses random search to solve the opti-
mization.
5 Improving Conformal Evaluation
While the Transductive Conformal Evaluator (TCE) used
in the original proposal [15] appears to perform well, the
complexity of the TCE is such that it becomes increasingly
difficult to apply to larger datasets. For instance, it is not
computationally feasible to apply vanilla TCE during the
experiments §6. If fitting a single instance of the underlying
classifier takes 10 CPU minutes, as is approximately the case
for §6, we estimate a single run using vanilla TCE would take
1.9 CPU years.
Here we propose a number of novel conformal evaluators
that overcome this limitation and present their advantages and
disadvantages. A comparison of their runtime complexities is
presented in Table 1.
5.1 Approximate Transductive Conformal
Evaluator (Approx-TCE)
Our first attempt at reducing the computational overhead in-
duced by the Transductive Conformal Evaluator is the approx-
imate Transductive Conformal Evaluator (approx-TCE). In
the original TCE, p-values are generated for each calibration
point by removing them from the training set, retraining the
underlying classifier on the remaining points, and repeating
until a p-value is computed for every training point.
In approx-TCE, calibration points are left out in batches,
rather than individually. The training set is randomly parti-
tioned into k folds of equal size. From the k folds, one fold is
used as the target of the calibration and the remaining k−1
folds are used as the bag to which those points are compared
to. This process repeats k times, until each fold has been
used as the calibration set exactly once. Note that all of the
k calibration sets are mutually exclusive; the corresponding
batches of p-values are then concatenated in the same man-
ner as in TCE. Algorithm 1 describes this process formally,
while Figure 5 depicts the graphical intuition.
The statistical soundness of the approx-TCE relies on the
assumption that the decision boundary obtained from leav-
ing out calibration points in batches approximates each of
the decision boundaries that would have been obtained per
calibration point in the batch if the point had been left out
individually. If this assumption holds, the generated p-values
will be the same as or similar to the p-values generated with a
TCE. The approximation grows more accurate as k increases
until k equals the cardinality of the training set at which point
the approx-TCE and the TCE are equivalent. In this sense, the
approx-TCE can be viewed as a generalization of the TCE.
While this assumption is more likely to hold with algo-
rithms with lower variance (e.g., linear models), it becomes
less and less likely to hold as the variance increases unless k is
increased also—sacrificing the computation saved to mitigate
the statistical instability.
5.2 Inductive Conformal Evaluator (ICE)
The second conformal evaluator we propose is the Inductive
Conformal Evaluator (ICE) which, unlike the approx-TCE,
is based on a corresponding approach from conformal predic-
tion theory [24, 34, 35]. The ICE directly splits the training
set into two non-empty partitions: the proper training set and
the calibration set. The underlying algorithm is trained on the
proper training set, and p-values are computed for each exam-
ple in the calibration set. In contrast to the TCE, p-values are
not calculated for every training point, but only for examples
in the calibration set, with the proper training set having no
role in the calibration at all. The ICE aims to inductively learn
a general rule on a single fold of the training set. Algorithm 2
describes this process formally, while Figure 5 depicts the
graphical intuition.
This induces significantly less computational overhead than
the TCE and approx-TCE (see Table 1) and in practice is
extremely fast, but it is also very informationally inefficient.
Only a small proportion of the training data is used to calibrate
the conformal evaluator, when ideally we would use all of
it. Additionally, the performance of the evaluator depends
heavily on the quality of the split and the calibration set’s
ability to generalize to the remainder of the dataset. This
results in some uncertainty: an ICE may perform worse than
its TCE counterpart due to a lack of information, or better due
to a lucky split.
5.3 Cross-Conformal Evaluator (CCE)
Finally, the Cross-Conformal Evaluator (CCE) draws on in-
spiration from k-fold cross validation and attempts to reduce
both the computational and informational limitations of the
TCE and ICE.
With the CCE, the training set is partitioned into k folds
of equal size. In order to make use of the entire training
set, each fold is treated as the calibration set in turn, with p-
values calculated as with an ICE, using the union of the k−1
remaining folds as the proper training set to fit the underlying
classifier.
The question is how to concatenate the p-values in a way
which preserves their statistical integrity when evaluating de-
cision quality. The k fit underlying models and corresponding
calibration sets should be set aside for test time. When a new
point arrives, the prediction from each classifier should be
evaluated against the corresponding calibration set. The final
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TCE
ICE
Approx-TCE
CCE
Example excluded from splitTarget of p-value calculation Example included in bag 
Figure 5: Illustration of the different calibration splits employed by each of the conformal evaluators.
Table 1: Runtime complexities for conformal evaluators calibration where
n is the number of training examples and p is the proportion of examples
included in the proper training set each split/fold.
CONFORMAL EVALUATOR COMPLEXITY
TCE O(n2)
Approx-TCE, 1/(1− p) folds O(n/(1− p))
ICE O(pn)
CCE, 1/(1− p) folds O(pn/(1− p))
result is the majority vote over the k folds, i.e., the prediction
of a particular class is accepted if the number of accepted
classifications is greater than k2 , and rejected otherwise. For
this reason it is beneficial to choose an odd k, to guarantee
that there will always be a majority. Algorithm 3 describes
the calibration process formally, while Figure 5 depicts the
graphical intuition.
The CCE can be viewed as k ICEs, one for each fold, and
these separate ICEs can be operated in parallel to reduce the
computation time—if the resources are available. However,
there is an additional memory cost with storing the separate
models. As well as the ICE, the CCE also has a counterpart
rooted in conformal prediction theory [36].
5.4 Threshold Search
To support the calibration of our new conformal evaluators,
we propose an alternative random search strategy to replace
the exhaustive grid search used in the original paper [15].
In the exhaustive grid search, each possible combination of
thresholds over all classes is tested systematically, typically
considering some fixed range of variables V = {v : v ∈ [0,1]}.
However, this suffers from the curse of dimensionality [6],
resulting in |V ||Y | total trials, growing exponentially with the
number of classes. Additionally, reducing the granularity of
the range considered in V increases the risk of ‘skipping’
over an optimal threshold combination. Similarly, the it is
difficult to avoid iterating over many useless threshold combi-
nations (where one is either too high or too low). This failure
to evenly cover subspaces of interest worsens as the dimen-
sionality increases [7], making it especially problematic for
multiclass classification. The granularity at values are chosen
for V can be chosen manually based on intuition and past
experience, however this results in experiment parameters
which are difficult to reproduce and transfer to other settings.
It has been shown for hyperparameter optimization that ran-
dom search is able to find combinations of variables at least
as optimal as those found with full grid search over the same
domain, at a fraction of the computational cost [7]. We apply
these findings to the threshold calibration and replace the
exhaustive grid search with a random search (Algorithm 4).
We choose random combinations of thresholds in the inter-
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val [0,1], keeping track of the thresholds that maximize our
chosen metric given the constraints (see §4.4). The search
continues until either of two conditions are met. An limit is
set on the number of iterations, mainly determined by the time
and resources that are available to be invested in the calibra-
tion. Intuitively a higher number will increase the likelihood
of finding better thresholds and so this acts as the upper bound
of the optimization. Secondly, the calibration will end when a
stop condition is met. In this work we consider a no-update
approach in which the search will stop once a fixed point is
found, i.e., if there is no improvement to performance after a
number of consecutive iterations.
We note that this procedure can be easily parallelised. We
perform an empirical comparison between the previous grid
search and our random search strategy in §5.4.
6 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluate the effectiveness of our novel conformal evalu-
ators when faced with a gradual concept drift caused by the
evolution of real malicious Android apps over time (§6.2).
Additionally, we compare the performance gained when in-
troducing confidence to the decision evaluation against using
credibility alone (§6.3), and compare our random search im-
plementation against an exhaustive search (§5.4). Our goal in
this investigation is to determine which settings are optimal
for a deployment of TRANSCEND and conformal evaluation
in the wild.
6.1 Experimental Settings
Prototype. We develop a prototype of TRANSCEND that
encompasses the functionality from the original work [15] as
well as our new proposals. Note that this is the first publicly
available implementation of TRANSCEND in any form. The
prototype is implemented as a Python library that aims to be
familiar to users of popular ML frameworks such as scikit-
learn [26]. We release the code as open source and make it
available to other researchers (see §9).
Dataset As a case study, here we focus on malware detec-
tion in the Android domain. The original evaluation of TRAN-
SCEND [15] artificially simulated concept drift by fusing two
datasets: DREBIN [4] and MARVIN [18], a process which may
have induced experimental bias. We instead sample 232,848
benign and 26,387 malicious apps (~10% prevalence) from
ANDROZOO [2]. This should allow us to demonstrate efficacy
when faced with a more natural, surreptitious concept drift.
The apps span 5 years, from Jan 2014 through to Dec 2018.
Dataset Split We use the TESSERACT [27] framework to
carry out temporal evaluations, ensuring that TESSERACT’s
constraints are accounted for to remove sources of spatial
and temporal experimental bias. Training and calibration are
performed using apps from 2014 and testing is evaluated over
the concept drift that occurs over the remaining period on a
month-by-month basis.
Classifier For the underlying classifier, we use DREBIN [4]
which has been shown to achieve state-of-the-art performance
if a retraining strategy is used to remediate concept drift [27].
Due to this, we hypothesize that if TRANSCEND is used to
reject drifting points, DREBIN will be able to classify the
remaining points with high accuracy. DREBIN uses a linear
SVM as the learning algorithm and a binary feature space in
which a Android components (activities, permissions, URLs,
services, etc) are represented as either absent (0) of present
(1).
Calibration To optimize the thresholding, we aim to max-
imize the F1 of all kept elements while maintaining an ac-
ceptable rejection rate of <15%. These metrics are computed
in aggregate for each time period of the temporal evaluation.
For the random search we use 100,000 random iterations
with early stopping after 3000 consecutive events without
improvement.
6.2 Novel Conformal Evaluators
Here we compare our novel conformal evaluators: ICE and
CCE. Since vanilla TCE is not feasible for this experiment
setting due to the size of the dataset, we do not evaluate it and
use approx-TCE as a proxy for the transductive setting.
Performance Metrics Figure 6 shows the the F1, Precision,
and Recall (rows) for each of the novel evaluators (columns).
The middle dashed line of each plot shows the baseline per-
formance when no rejection mechanism is enforced. This
depicts the performance degradation caused by the concept
drift present in the dataset resulting from an evolving mali-
cious class. Note that classifiers degrade rapidly, becoming
worse than random guessing in under one year.
The upper solid line with square markers shows the perfor-
mance of kept elements, elements with test p-values that fell
above the threshold of their predicted classes. While degrada-
tion is still present, approx-TCE and ICE are able to maintain
F1 > 0.8 for two years, extending the effectiveness of the
model by at least another year—doubling its lifespan.
The lower solid line with circle markers shows the perfor-
mance of rejected elements. This is the performance on ele-
ments that were rejected. High metrics represent erroneously
rejected elements whereas low metrics mean that the rejected
elements would have been incorrectly classified by the under-
lying classifier and so were rightfully rejected. Approx-TCE
and ICE both have F1, Precision, and Recall of 0 for rejected
elements at every test month meaning that every element that
was rejected would have been misclassified.
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(e) ICE, Precision
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Figure 6: F1-Score, Precision, and Recall for the three proposed conformal evaluators using credibility p-values. The dashed line shows the performance with no
rejection mechanism. The upper line ( marker) shows the performance on kept examples whose classifications were accepted. The lower line (# marker) shows
the performance on rejected examples. These are the mistakes that would have been made if the predictions were accepted by the degrading model. The bars
show the proportion of rejected elements in each period.
The result of CCE differs in that it is less conservative
in its rejections. The performance of kept elements is much
higher, but the performance of rejected elements is higher
as well, indicating that a small proportion of the rejected
elements would have actually been correctly classified. We
have observed that this conservatism can be increased or
decreased by modifying the conditions of the majority vote. If
more folds are required to agree before a decision is accepted,
the CCE will be more conservative, rejecting more elements.
If less folds are required, more elements will be accepted. In
this respect, CCE offers an alternative dimension of tuning
in addition to the threshold optimization. Additionally, this is
a parameter that can be altered during a deployment, rather
than being set at calibration. This allows for some adaptibility
depending on the deployment scenario: for example when
the cost of False Negatives is very high (e.g., not alerting
security teams to attacks in network intrusion detection), or
when the cost of False Positives if very high (e.g., witholding
benign emails in spam detection, or disabling legitimate user
accounts in fake account detection).
Rejection Rates The rejection rate as a proportion of test-
ing elements for each month is shown by the grey columns
in each plot of Figure 6. For each of the classifiers the re-
jection rate begins close to the limit enforced at calibration
before slowly rising over each year. This is indicative of the
increasing concept drift as the malicious apps diverge further
and further from the training distribution. We note that while
the rejection rates may appear high, these are symptomatic of
poor performance in the underlying classifier and are often
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(c) CCE, cred
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46
Testing period (month)
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
(d) Approx-TCE, cred + conf
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(e) ICE, cred + conf
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(g) Approx-TCE, probabilities
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(h) ICE, probabilities
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Figure 7: F1-Score for the three proposed conformal evaluators using quality metrics based on credibility p-values, a combination of credibility and confidence
p-values, and probabilities. The dashed line shows the performance with no rejection mechanism. The upper line ( marker) shows the performance on kept
examples whose classifications were accepted. The lower line (# marker) shows the performance on rejected examples. The bars show the proportion of rejected
elements in each period. Note the first row (a, b, c) is identical to the first row of Figure 6, replicated here for ease of comparison.
preferable to taking incorrect actions on False Positives and
False Negatives. In an extreme pathological case where a
classifier predicts the opposite of the true label every time, re-
jection rates could reach 100% but the F1-score of the rejected
elements would be 0.
Runtime The runtime of the conformal evaluators during
this experiment match what would be expected from their
relative complexities (cf. Table 1). The ICE was the quickest,
taking 11.5 CPU hours. The CCE took 35.6 CPU hours, but
our implementation is parallelized resulting in a wall-clock
time identical to the ICE. Finally, the TCE took 46.1 CPU
hours. As mentioned previously, vanilla TCE was computa-
tionally infeasible, but we estimate a runtime of 1.9 CPU years
given the time to fit the underlying classifier (approximately
10 minutes).
From this we conclude that the ICE is the most useful
for settings where resources are limited or models with a
quick iteration cycle (e.g., daily), while the CCE offers greater
confidence and flexibility at a slightly higher computational
cost.
6.3 Credibility, Confidence, and Probabilities
Credibility with Confidence Intuition would suggest that
including confidence thresholds when evaluating a classifier
prediction would be beneficial. This is because confidence
represents how certain the classifier was in its own prediction.
However, given that credibility is the main indicator that i.i.d.
has been violated and thus that concept drift is occurring, it is
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unclear how much benefit can be gained by introducing con-
fidence. Here we test the intuition empirically by evaluating
the conformal evaluators under the same conditions as §6.2,
but using a per-class threshold for confidence as well as a for
credibility.
Figure 7 compares the F1 performance of each confor-
mal evaluator (columns) using different thresholding metrics
(rows). Here the upper blue line shows the performance of
kept elements while the lower red line shows the performance
of rejected elements. The grey dashed middle line depicts the
baseline performance when no rejection mechanism is used.
The first row of plots shows the results with each evaluator
using credibility only, note that this is the same as the first
row in Figure 6, repeated to ease comparison.
The second row shows the F1 performance when confi-
dence is introduced. The performance for the approx-TCE
and CCE is relatively unchanged, while the performance of
the ICE is markedly improved with degradation being post-
poned much longer than before. The confidence appears to
restore some of the statistical information lost by using only
a small amount of the training data for calibration.
However, the computational cost required to find thresh-
olds is much higher than with credibility only. Introducing
confidence is equivalent to doubling the number of classes,
vastly increasing the length of time required to find accept-
able thresholds. From this we conclude that the performance
gain obtained from introducing confidence likely does not
outweigh the computational cost. Although it might improve
the accuracy of an ICE, using a CCE will often provide the
same accuracy with comparable calibration time.
Probabilities The lowest row of Figure 7 shows the F1 per-
formance when the classifier’s output probabilities are used
for thresholding, rather than generating per-class p-values
for each calibration and testing point. For each conformal
evaluator, the same training and calibration split as was used
with p-values is used, to ensure a fair comparison. The plot
shows that probabilities alone offer a very small improvement
for kept elements over the baseline in the first year, becom-
ing increasingly volatile and less reliable as the concept drift
becomes more severe. In all cases, probabilities result in an
unacceptably high level of erroneous rejections compared to
p-values. From this we conclude that the statistical support
offered by the conformal evaluator’s p-value computation is
significant and justifies the additional computational overhead
that it induces.
6.4 Full Grid Search vs Random search
Here we evaluate the performance of our random search im-
plementation (§5.4) compared to the full grid search used in
the original proposal [15]. We aim to show that the random
search is able to find high quality calibration thresholds in a
more efficient manner than the full search.
As the grid search is extremely expensive, in this experi-
ment we train and calibrate on 1 month of data and test on
the remaining 59 months using an approx-TCE with 10 folds.
We maximize F1 while maintaining an acceptable rejection
rate of <15%. To ensure our baseline discovers high quality
thresholds we use a fine granularity grid and cover 1,317,520
combinations of class thresholds. For the random search we
set an upper limit of 10,000 trials.
Table 3 shows the confusion matrices when no rejection
is applied (a), when rejection is applied using the thresholds
from the full grid search (b), and when rejection is applied
using the thresholds from random search (c). Note that there is
no significant performance difference between the two search
strategies, but the random search was able to cover the same
search space with two orders of magnitude fewer trials. We
observe that the full grid search makes assumptions on the
distribution of quality thresholds which the random search
does not. Additionally, while the random search allows for a
variety of stopping conditions, the only mechanism to control
the length of the full grid search is the size of the interval to
search and the granularity of the search steps—the suitability
of which is difficult to determine beforehand.
7 Operational Guidance
Here we discuss some actionable points regarding the use of
conformal evaluation and Transcend.
TRANSCEND in a Detection Pipeline TRANSCEND has
particular applications in detection tasks where there is a high
cost of False Positives, (e.g., spam [23], malware [4, 11, 31],
fake accounts [9, 10]). In these cases, it may be preferable
to avoid taking a decision on low-confidence predictions or,
where a gradated response is possible, diverting rejected ex-
amples towards alternative remediation actions. Consider an
example in the fake accounts setting: owners of accounts in
the set of rejected positive predictions can be asked to solve
a CAPTCHA on their next login (a relatively easy check to
pass) while the owners of accounts in the set of kept positive
predictions can be asked to send proof of their identity. In-
creasing rejection rates signal a performance degradation of
the underlying classifier without immediately submitting to
the errors it produces, giving engineers more time to iterate
and remediate.
Operational Recommendations Based on our empirical
evaluation (§6), we summarise some of the key findings and
make the following recommendations for TRANSCEND de-
ployments:
• TRANSCEND is agnostic to the underlying learning algo-
rithm, but the quality of the rejection relies on the suit-
ability of the NCM. Some examples of possible NCMs
for different types of classifiers are described in Figure 1.
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Table 2: Area Under Time (AUT) of F1 performance with respect to concept drift over the 48 month testing period for different quality metrics: credibility,
credibility with confidence, and probabilities (cf. Figure 7).
Approx-TCE ICE CCE
Credibility
AUT(F1 baseline, 48m) .480 .440 .483
AUT(F1 kept, 48m) .829 .762 .950
AUT(F1 rejected, 48m) .000 .000 .064
Credibility + Confidence
AUT(F1 baseline, 48m) .480 .440 .483
AUT(F1 kept, 48m) .822 .887 .962
AUT(F1 rejected, 48m) .000 .000 .063
Probabilities
AUT(F1 baseline, 48m) .456 .405 .455
AUT(F1 kept, 48m) .531 .388 .532
AUT(F1 rejected, 48m) .410 .426 .410
Table 3: Confusion matrices showing the performance of optimal thresholds discovered using a full grid search vs random search. The random search was able to
discover thresholds equivalent to the full grid search but with two orders of magnitude fewer trials.
(a) Baseline
Example Benign Malicious
Benign 6,518 3,529
Malicious 19,486 225,874
(b) Full grid search
Example Benign Malicious
Benign 6,518 2,187
Malicious 0 198,060
Number of trials 1,317,520
(c) Random search
Example Benign Malicious
Benign 6,518 3,259
Malicious 0 197,983
Number of trials 10,000
• Using an ICE or CCE is preferred over TCE due to their
computational efficiency, and are preferred over approx-
TCE due to approx-TCE’s reliance on assumptions that
may not universally hold.
• ICEs are relatively fast and lightweight and excel when
resources are limited. Conversely, CCEs make rejections
with higher confidence but at a higher computational
cost.
• Thresholding with credibility alone is sufficient to
achieve high quality prediction across all conformal eval-
uators. While confidence can improve the stability of an
ICE, it is associated with an increase in calibration time.
• Random search is preferred over an exhaustive grid
search as it can find more effective thresholds given
less calibration time.
• Rising rejection rates should be monitored and used to
signal when the underlying model is degrading. This
signal can be used to trigger model retraining or other
remediation strategies.
8 Related Work
Conformal evaluation is based on conformal prediction the-
ory, a mechanism for producing predictions that are correct
with some guaranteed confidence [29]. Additionally, the ICE
and CCE are inspired by inductive [24, 34, 35] and cross-
conformal predictors [36], respectively. However, conformal
prediction is intended to be used exclusively in settings where
the exchangeability assumption holds which makes it unsuit-
able for adversarial contexts such as malware classification.
In this regard, we are the first to ‘join the dots’ between the
conformal prediction of Vovk et al. [35] and the conformal
evaluation of Jordaney et al. [15] and show how the viola-
tion of conformal prediction’s assumptions is detected and
exploited by TRANSCEND to detect concept drift.
TRANSCEND was originally proposed at USENIX 2017
by Jordaney et al. [15]. This work introduced the concept
of conformal evaluation based on conformal prediction the-
ory and the use of p-values for calibrating and enforcing a
rejection strategy for malware classification. However the
evaluation artificially simulated concept drift by merging mal-
ware datasets which could have introduced experimental bias.
In our experiments we sample from a single repository of
applications and perform a temporal evaluation to simulate
natural concept drift caused by the real evolution of malicious
Android apps. Additionally, the role of confidence in thresh-
olding was unclear, and the use of exhaustive grid search
to find thresholds was suboptimal compared to our random
search. Most significantly, the TCE employed by the original
work was not practical for real-world deployments, which we
rectify by proposing the ICE and CCE.
Other works have explored alternative solutions to tack-
ling concept drift. Xu et al. [38] propose DROIDEVOLVER,
a malware detection system motivated by TRANSCEND that
identifies drifting examples based on disagreements between
models in an ensemble. As models degrade, the examples
identified as drifting are used to update the models in an
online fashion. While this solution requires less resources
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than TRANSCEND, the system retrains using predicted labels
rather than ground truth labels which can result in a negative
feedback loop. Other solutions solely adapt to concept drift
without using rejection: DROIDOL [22] and CASANDRA [21]
use online learning to continually retrain the models, using
API call graphs as features. Like all online-trained neural
networks, these approaches are susceptible to catastrophic
forgetting [14], where the performance begins to degrade on
older examples as the model attempts to adapt to the new
distribution. Pendlebury et al. [27] present a comparison of
different strategies for combatting concept drift, including
rejection, incremental retraining, and online learning, illus-
trating the advantages and disadvantages of each.
The related problem of detecting adversarial examples
is addressed by Sotgiu et al. [30], who propose a rejection
strategy for neural network-based classifiers that identifies
anomalies in the latent feature representation of an example
at different layers of the neural network. Additionally, Paper-
not and McDaniel [25] combine a conformal predictor with a
k-Nearest Neighbor algorithm to identify low quality predic-
tions that are indicative of adversarial inputs. However, both
of these methods are restricted to deep learning-based image
classification.
9 Availability
We make TRANSCEND’s code available to researchers and
practitioners alike, to aid with the scalable identification and
remediation of concept drift. We also release the data used in
the empirical evaluations. The TRANSCEND project website
can be found at https://s2lab.kcl.ac.uk/transcend.
10 Conclusion
Following the proposal of TRANSCEND [15], rejection strate-
gies have seemed like a promising solution to the issue of
concept drift. However, TRANSCEND left a number of open
questions around its theoretical soundness, optimal configura-
tion, and real-world practicality.
In this work we provided a formal treatment of TRAN-
SCEND which acts as the missing link between conformal
prediction and conformal evaluation. We have empirically de-
termined which configurations perform best and how they can
be tuned depending on the operational settings. Finally, we
have proposed additional conformal evaluators which match
or surpass the performance of the original while significantly
decreasing the computational overhead.
We envision these improvements will enable researchers
and practitioners alike to make use of conformal evaluation
and TRANSCEND to build rejection strategies to improve
the quality of security detection pipelines. To accommodate
this, we also release the first publicly available TRANSCEND
implementation to the security community.
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A Symbol Table
Table 4 reports the major symbols and abbreviations used
throughout the paper. The readers can use this table as a
reference for the notation.
B Conformal Evaluator Algorithms
Here we present the algorithms for calibrating TCE, ICE, and
CCE.
C Random Search Calibration Algorithm
Here we present the algorithm for our random search calibra-
tion implementation.
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TTable 4: Table of symbols and abbreviations.SYMBOL DESCRIPTIONX Feature space X ⊆ Rn.Y Label space.z Example pair (x,y) ∈ X ×Y .z∗ Previously unseen testing example.yˆ Predicted class g(z∗).
az Nonconformity score output by an NCM for a given point z.
pz Statistical p-value for a given point z.
pyz Statistical p-value for a given point z, calculated with respect to class y ∈ Y (used in label conditional
calculations).
τy A TRANSCEND rejection threshold τy ∈ [0,1] for class y ∈ Y .
T The set of all per-class rejection thresholds {τy ∈ [0,1] | y ∈ Y }.
B Bag of examples Hz1,z2, ...,znI.
d Distance function d(z,z′).
zˆ Point predictor zˆ(B).
A Noncomformity measure (NCM) usually composed of a distance function and point predictor.
S Collection of noncomformity scores computed in elements of B, relative to other elements in B,
S = HA(B\ HzI,z) : z ∈ BI.
g Classifier g : X −→ Y that assigns object x ∈ X to class y ∈ Y . Also known as the decision function.
ε Significance level used in conformal prediction to define prediction region with certain confidence
guarantees.
TCE Transductive Conformal Evaluator.
ICE Inductive Conformal Evaluator.
CCE Cross-Conformal Evaluator.
NCM Nonconformity measure.
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Algorithm 1: Transductive Conformal Evaluator (TCE and approximate TCE)
Input: Z = Hz0,z1, . . . ,zn−1I, n training examples
Z∗ = Hz∗0,z∗1, . . .I, stream of testing examples
A, NCM for producing nonconformity scores
k ∈ N, number of folds—TCE is approximate when k < n
Output: Stream of boolean decisions 0 = re ject,1 = accept
Calibration Phase
1 P← 0
2 i← 0
3 partition Z equally into Zpart ←{Z′0,Z′1, . . . ,Z′k−1 }
4 foreach partition Z′ of Zpart do
5 Z′′← Z \Z′
6 g← Fit (Z′′)
7 foreach z′ of Z′ do
8 yˆ← g(z′) . Predicted label
9 Z′yˆ← Hz ∈ Z′ : z.y = yˆI . Bag of examples with same label
10 αz′ ← A(Z′yˆ,z′) . Nonconformity score
11 S← HA(Z′yˆ \ HzI) : z ∈ Z′yˆI . Nonconformity scores for bag elements
12 pz′ ← |α∈S:α>=αz′ ||S| . Credibility p-value
13 Pi← pz′
14 i← i+1
15 end
16 end
17 t∗←Transcend.FindThresholds (Z,Yˆ ,P)
Test Phase
18 g← Fit (Z)
19 foreach z∗ of Z∗ do
20 yˆ← g(z∗) . Predicted label for test example
21 Zyˆ← Hz ∈ Z : z.y = yˆI . Bag of training examples with same label
22 αz∗ ← A(Zyˆ,z∗) . Nonconformity score
23 S← HA(Zyˆ \ HzI) : z ∈ ZyˆI . Nonconformity scores for bag elements
24 pz∗ ← |α∈S :α>=αz∗ ||S| . Credibility p-value
25 if Pz∗ < t∗yˆ then emit 0 else emit 1
26 end
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Algorithm 2: Inductive Conformal Evaluator (ICE)
Input: Z = Hz0,z1, . . . ,zn−1I, n training examples
Z∗ = Hz∗0,z∗1, . . .I, stream of testing examples
A, NCM for producing nonconformity scores
m, number of examples to use for calibration
Output: Stream of boolean decisions 0 = re ject,1 = accept
Calibration Phase
1 P← 0
2 Yˆ ← 0
3 i← 0
4 Ztr← Hz0,z1, . . . ,zn−m−1I
5 Zcal ← Hzn−m,zn−m+1, . . . ,zn−1I
6 foreach z′ of Zcal do
7 g← Fit (Zcal \ Hz′I)
8 yˆ← Yˆ i← g(z′) . Predicted label
9 Zcalyˆ ← Hz ∈ Zcal : z.y = yˆI . Bag of examples with same label
10 αz′ ← A(Zcalyˆ ,z′) . Nonconformity score
11 S← HA(Zcalyˆ \ HzI) : z ∈ Zcalyˆ I . Nonconformity scores for bag elements
12 pz′ ← |α∈S :α>=αz′ ||S| . Credibility p-value
13 Pi← pz′
14 i← i+1
15 end
16 t∗←Transcend.FindThresholds (Z,Yˆ ,P)
Test Phase
17 g← Fit (Ztr)
18 foreach z∗ of Z∗ do
19 yˆ← g(z∗) . Predicted label for test example
20 Zcalyˆ ← Hz ∈ Zcal : z.y = yˆI . Bag of training examples with same label
21 αz∗ ← A(Zcalyˆ ,z∗) . Nonconformity score
22 S← HA(Zcalyˆ \ HzI) : z ∈ Zcalyˆ I . Nonconformity scores for bag elements
23 pz∗ ← |α∈S :α>=αz∗ ||S| . Credibility p-value
24 if Pz∗ < t∗yˆ then emit 0 else emit 1
25 end
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Algorithm 3: Cross-Conformal Evaluator (CCE)
Input: Z = Hz0,z1, . . . ,zn−1I, n training examples
Z∗ = Hz∗0,z∗1, . . .I, stream of testing examples
A, NCM for producing nonconformity scores
k ∈ {2t+1 : t ∈ N}, number of folds
Output: Stream of boolean decisions 0 = re ject,1 = accept
Calibration Phase
1 P← Yˆ ← G← t∗← 0
2 i← j← 0
3 partition Z equally into {Z′0,Z′1, . . . ,Z′k−1 }
4 foreach j of {0,1, . . . ,k−1} do
5 foreach z′ of Z′j do
6 g← Fit (Z′j \ Hz′I)
7 yˆ← Yˆ j,i← g(z′) . Predicted label
8 Z′jyˆ ← Hz ∈ Z′j : z.y = yˆI . Bag of examples with same label
9 αz′ ← A(Z′jyˆ ,z′) . Nonconformity score
10 S← HA(Z′jyˆ \ HzI) : z ∈ Z′jyˆI . Nonconformity scores for bag elements
11 P j,i← |α∈S :α>=αz′ ||S| . Credibility p-value
12 i← i+1
13 end
14 G j← Fit (Z \Z′j)
15 T ∗j ←Transcend.FindThresholds (Z′j,Yˆ j ,P j)
16 end
Test Phase
17 s← 0
18 foreach z∗ of Z∗ do
19 foreach j of {0,1, . . . ,k−1} do
20 yˆ← G j(z∗) . Predicted label for test example
21 Z′jyˆ ← Hz ∈ Z′j : z.y = yˆI . Bag of training examples with same label
22 αz∗ ← A(Z′jyˆ ,z∗) . Nonconformity score
23 S← HA(Z′jyˆ \ HzI) : z ∈ Z′jyˆI . Nonconformity scores for bag elements
24 pz∗ ← |α∈S :α>=αz∗ ||S| . Credibility p-value
25 if Pz∗ ≥ T ∗jyˆ then s← s+1 . Track positive evaluations
26 end
27 if s < k/2 then emit 0 else emit 1 . Majority vote for final decision
28 end
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TAlgorithm 4: TRANSCEND threshold calibration using random searchInput :y, yˆ, pvalcInput: Y ∈ Y n, ground truth labels for n examplesYˆ ∈ Y n, predicted labels for n examplesP ∈ Rn×|Y |, per-class p-values for n examples
Parameters :m ∈ R, maximum number of iterations
F : Y × Yˆ ×P−→ R, performance measure to optimize (e.g., F1)
G : Y × Yˆ ×P−→ R, performance measure to constrain (e.g., kept examples)
C ∈ R, lower bound for constrained measure G
Output: t∗, a vector of per-class thresholds
Output: t∗ ∈ [0,1]|Y |, a vector of per-class thresholds
1 t∗← 0
2 counter← 0
3 while counter < m do
4 t $←− [0,1]|Y | . Pick random thresholds
5 if F (Y ,Yˆ ,P; t)> F (Y ,Yˆ ,P; t∗) and G(Y ,Yˆ ,P; t)≥ C then
6 t∗← t
7 else if F (Y ,Yˆ ,P; t) = F (Y ,Yˆ ,P; t∗) and G(Y ,Yˆ ,P; t)> G(Y ,Yˆ ,P; t∗) then
8 t∗← t
9 counter← counter + 1
10 end
11 return t∗
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